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Paternalism:
A Search for Acceptable and Applicable
Principles of Intervention
Jennifer L. Browning

At seven-thirty-one A.M. on Saturday morning I am awakened by
a phone call from mom,

"Oh honey--it's a beautiful sunny day that

I knew you wouldn't want to sleep through.

Now that you are awake

go outside and breathe the morning air .... No, no, that's ok, I'll
wait ... you go ahead and do that .. "

After I breathe and get mom off

the phone I reach over and turn on my stereo.
fills the room I

As New Age music

remember when my roommate switched the George

Winston music I fall asleep to with a subliminal weight-loss tape.
(I lost five pounds that
next week).

week-~gained

it back plus five more the

I grab my shoes and head toward the door--I don't want

to be late for skydiving class--but as I am leaving my friend W.
pulls into the;driveway blocking my car.

She jumps out, pulls me

into her car and drives away, saying "Skydiving is for dangerous
fools.

I am taking you to play bingo instead."

More than likely you or I would not wake up to a day like this
one, but the example is meant to illustrate something important.
Paternalism is a common phenomenon, one we probably encounter more
often than we realize.

Even though we do not always realize them

as such, thoughts and judgements on paternalism are employed in
decisions we make

in day-to-day situations about how to

treat

people. An investigation of this liberty-limiting principle, then,
should be of practical interest to everyone, not just philosophers
interested

in

theory.

I

will

investigate

the

sUbject

of

paternalism by looking at a variety of definitions and examples,
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exploring the autonomy-based antipaternalist positions of Immanuel
Kant and John stuart Mill, and finally, incorporating the ideas of
Christine

Korsgaard,

a

neo-Kantian

philosopher,

on

personal

identity into an argument for a Kantian version of respect for
autonomy.

Finally,

I

will present some general guidelines for

paternalistic interference that can be applied practically.

Definitions and Ideas about Paternalism
The term "paternalism" carries traces of the idea "father
knows

best."

Many aspects

of

the

parent-child

relationship

operate on the presumption that the parent, mother or father, knows
better than the child what is in the child's best interest.

It is

accepted that parents are authoritarians in their children's lives
because it is assumed they, as mature individuals with benevolent
motives,

will be better judges of what is in the child's best

interest than the child herself, who has less developed capacities
for deliberation and rational choice.

Paternalism in general can

be thought of as an extrapolation of this model of authority to
other

relationships

in which

one

party assumes

a

"parental"

position of sorts over another party in the second party's own
interests' .
As defined by Gerald Dworkin, paternalism is "the interference
with a person's liberty of action justified by reasons referring
exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or
values of the person being coerced"
'from Kleinig.
3

(20).

Joel Feinberg makes a number of distinctions between different
types of

paternalism:

harm paternalism vs. benefit paternalism,

and weak vs. strong paternalism.

The goal of harm paternalism is

protection of the object of paternalism from self-inflicted harm,
where as the goal of benefit paternalism is the benefit of the
object of paternalism.
The distinction between weak and strong paternalism Feinberg
draws is based on the degree of vOluntariness with which an agent
engages in self-regarding conduct and has obvious similarities to
John stuart Mill's work. An action is voluntary to the extent that
it is undertaken by an agent "informed of all relevant facts and
contingencies,

and

in the absence of all coercive pressure of

compulsion" (Feinberg SP48).

(Misinformation, impaired

faculties, obsessive compulsions,

judgement

immaturity and lack of physical

control over one's own body all decrease the vOluntariness of an
agent's

conduct.)

actions

to

Interference

determine

whether

into

or

not

another's
an

self-regarding

individual

is

acting

voluntarily or in cases where an individual is indeed acting non
voluntarily

is weak paternalism,

and

is generally accepted as

justified even by antipaternalists because there is a sense in
which the agent is not making a real choice to accept the risks
involved in her behavior.

(Feinberg does however point out that

"Even substantially non-voluntary choices deserve protection" when
they are not particularly dangerous or risky to the agent (SP49).
strong paternalism justifies limiting A's freedom to X where A's
actions

are

primarily

voluntary
4

and

where

X

•

concerns/effects/regards only A, on the grounds that it is in A's
best interest to be limited from X.
In Paternalistic Intervention Donald VanDeVeer defines a
paternalistic

act

generally

altruistic motives,

as

one

in

which

person

A,

with

interferes with S in ways "contrary to the

operative preference or disposition" of S either to prevent harm to
or

promote

benefit

of

S

(19).

By

defining

paternalism

as

interference "contrary to the operative preference of S", VanDeVeer
is not trying to lable 'unwanted' argumentation or disscussion with
S as paternalism,
"shaping

but is

preferences"

"choices"

and

including various
"indoctrination"

within his defintion

techniques,

(19).

"suspect means"
to

control

Subliminal

others'

advertising

particular uses of hypnosis or sleep teaching,

brainwashing and propaganda campaigns are "mild"

of

and

if not common

examples of interference of this type and may not seem particularly
threatening.

Consider the other side of the spectrum, however: in

A. L. Huxley's Brave New World people are invasively programmed and
conditioned beginning almost from their scientific conception, to
have only certain likes and dislikes,

to hold only particular

ideals and political preferences.
Some

hold

that

to

consider

paternalism

only

as

the

intervention in another's actions is not to give it appropriate
scope.

Buchanan for example, argues that "to focus exclusively on

interference with liberty of action,

(however),

is to construe

paternalism too narrowly ... Paternalism is the interference with a
person's freedom of action or freedom of information ... ". (Buchanan
5
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61-62).

Withholding information from an individual because it is

deemed by others to be harmful to her,

or "forcing" particular

information that others judge to be in her best interest on an
individual who has chosen not to have the information, and giving
wrong information to an individual,
"her best

interest"

are all

(ie. lying), because it is in

forms of paternalism according to

Buchanan.
Since both benefit paternalism and weak

paternalism are

relatively non-controversial, the former being generally rejected
as

unjustified,

and

the

latter

generally

being

accepted

justified, I will not deal such cases at any length here.

as

Instead,

the focus of my discussion will be the more controversial case of
strong-harm paternalism,

where the agent is at risk of greatly

harming herself through conduct which is primarily voluntary.

Paternalism, The Harm Principle, and Legal Moralism
It is important not to confuse paternalism with other
liberty limiting principles such as the Harm Principle and Legal
Moralism.
liberty

The harm principle justifies restricting one person's
in

order

to

prevent

that

person

specific individuals or society in general.

from

injuring

other

This is a relatively

noncontroversial liberty-limiting principle as most people whole
heatedly support principles that protect their personal rights and
liberty

form

infringement

be

others,

and

with

a

minimum

of

interference, this restriction puts a check on freedom that allows
the preservation of the maximum amount of freedom for individuals
6
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consistent with

the

same

freedom

for

everyone

else.

without boundary degenerates into no freedom at all.

Freedom

Laws against

battery, murder, rape, theft, etc. as well as particular traffic
laws have as their object the protection of individual A from
individual B and vice versa.
Legal paternalism,

on the other hand,

is state action or

coercion (laws, statutes, court orders and rulings, etc.) with the
goal of "protecting" individuals from inflicting harm upon them
selves

or

consenting

to

be

harmed

by

others.

illegitimating consent to certain things,

(In

cases

of

"B's agreement must be

overruled for his own good, which the state presumes to know better
than he" (Feinberg HTS172) .
use

of

certain drugs,

Laws requiring prescriptions for the

and mandatory education

laws

are

often

justified paternalistically as are laws against recreational use of
particular drugs, dueling, prostitution, gambling, polygamy, aiding
a suicide, and selling one's self into slavery.
Laws against prostitution and gambling in particular may be
justified

paternalistically,

but

the

motivation

behind

such

legislation may also be moralistic (Feinberg HTS172) .
. . . is one person exploiting the weakness, or foolishness,
or recklessness of another ... If a weak, foolish, or
reckless person freely chooses to harm or risk harm to
himself, that is alright, but that is no reason why
another should be a part to it, or be permitted to
benefit himself at the other's expense" (HTS81).
Legal moralism is also applied in order to "protect" individuals'
moral sensibilities and perhaps to guide them in "appropriate"
directions as deemed by society in general.

Laws against "harmless

immoralities: such as consensual sexual practices done in private
7
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by adults are examples of prohibitions justified moralistically.
The distinction between legal paternalism and legal moralism is
quite sUbtle, but I intend to deal only with paternalism and not
legal moralism.
Examples of Paternalism
Paternalistic behavior is exhibited with regularity in many
different

contexts

and

situations;

government,

medicine,

and

personal relations all provide examples of paternalism.
Some of our laws, as I have already discussed, are primarily
justified paternalistically; mandatory seat belts or helmets (in
the case of motorcyclists), required health warnings on cigarette
advertisements

and packaging,

pUblic

curfews

dueling are more examples of legal paternalism.

and

laws

against

2

Paternalism is also common in the field of medicine.
Because

of

the

nature

of

the

physician-patient

"medical expert" to "non-expert",

relationship,

and the solidly held goal of

physicians to "benefit and not harm" their patients, many medical
situations reveal
physician.

paternalistic tendencies

(Problems of truth-telling,

confidentiality etc.)

Also,

on the part of

the

treatment decisions,

and

because it is commonly argued that

2 In some cases laws are justified on non-paternalistic grounds
as well; the state may hold that it has an interest in protecting
it's citizens from injuring themselves or draining themselves
financially and guiding them toward their own benefit as with
mandatory education laws.
As I lay comatose with brain damage
after a motorcycle crash my decision not to wear a helmet no longer
only affects myself; my insurance company, Medicaid, Medicare, and
my employer all shoulder some part of the burden resulting from my
decision to ride a motorcycle and not wear a helmet. If I grow up
illiterate and uneducated, I may become a burden on tax-supported
welfare systems because I can not get a job to support myself.

8

illness impairs autonomy, and therefore a patient's ability to make
certain decisions may be impaired, problems of

informed consent,

refusal of treatment, guardianship, and proxy-decision making, all
of which involve paternalism, exist in this context.
Personal
behaviors;

relationships

parent-child

lover, etc.

may

relations,

also

involve

friend

to

paternalistic

friend,

lover

to

Such relationships are characterized by intimacy and

interest in each other's affairs and attitudes of benevolence and
concern are developed between individuals who care about each other
and want to see each other have "good" lives.

Thus an atmosphere

very conducive to paternalistic impUlses exists in many personal
relationships; we may see ourselves as "protectors" of her needs
and wants even when she doesn't protect them herself: "After being
your best friend for ten years I

know you better than you know

yourself!"; we want him to have proj ects that are beneficial to him
and we want these projects to succeed:

("I just want what's best

for you").
Divided Intuitions
The

task

of

remaining

consistent

paternalism should be considered
because

the

nature

coercion/deception")

of

judging

when

justified is not an easy one

paternal ism

seems

while

i tsel f

inconsistent and

(i. e.

our

"benevolent

intuitions may

differ vastly between virtually identical cases depending upon our
perspective. When we act paternalistically toward someone, we often
engage in coercion and deception of another person; in the former
case we take over control of the individual's actions, leaving her
9
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wi th no power over her own conduct,

and in the latter case we

undermine her knowledge of her own affairs-she does not know what
is going on, so she cannot assent or dissent on matters that are
purely her own,
person.

and this also robs her of control of her own

These actions,

lying and using force,

are intuitively

unappealing and seem wrong, but when we add the "good motives" or
intentions of the paternalism, these actions take on a different
light: benevolent motives at least intuitively seem right.

Actions

that we might not otherwise approve of seem at least acceptable, if
not commendable, when they are motivated by "concern" for the good
of another.
Our intuitions about paternalism also depend somewhat on our
perspective of a paternalistic situation.

When we are in the role

of the "intervener" our benevolent impulses toward those we care
about, or a sense of duty to "benefit and do not harm " seem to
direct us to "protect" and "aid" other people when we see them as
needing "help".
decisions

of

Thus,

others to

we involve ourselves in the actions and
"protect"

them

and

"help"

them

choose

proj ects and make decisions that we think of as being good or
beneficial to them.

When we ourselves are the object of such

"protection" or "help", however,

our intuitions may be entirely

different; the "good intentions" of others seem overbearing and
intrusive, or we may see too much outside "help" as smothering our
freedom to do things for ourselves.

(Analogously, think all the

times you've given unasked for advice to others during times of
"trouble"; after all, what's a friend for but to help out when
10
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things seem to be going badly.

Now think of all the "advice" your

friends (or your mother) press on you when they think your life is
not going quite right.

The value of the "advice" often seems to

depend on who is the advisor or advisee.)

When sorting out our

ideas and judgements on paternalism, we must try to imagine what it
would really be like to live with these judgements.
must

put

ourselves

in

the

place

paternalism from her point of view.
While

further

examination

of

of

the

the

nature

To do this, we

victim

and

imagine

3

of

paternalistic

intervention reveals firm reasons for holding a strong presumption
in favor of non-interference, the study of specific cases will more
than

likely produce situations

contradict our intuitions.
presumption
encompassing,
believe,

is

This does not mean, however, that the

inappropriate;
and

such

a

in which this presumption will

it merely means

difficulty

a slight weakening,

can

lead

it
to,

is

not

at

but not complete disposal,

all-

most,

I

of· the

presumption.

Paternalism in a Liberal Society
I

would first like to establish a general presumption against

interference with autonomy by using ideas some brought up by John
Rawls in A Theory of Justice, though in something of a backwards
3This is an exercise in "Rawlsian" deliberative rationality:
" .. . the rational plan for a person is the one ... that would be
decided upon as the outcome of careful reflection in which the
agent reviewed, in light of all the relevant facts, what it would
be like to carry out these plans and thereby ascertained the course
of action that would best realize his more fundamental desires"
(TOJ417) .

11

•

fashion.

4

If we accept a liberal society, such as the one in

which we live, as the best kind of society, we must acknowledge a
strong presumption against paternalistic interference.
A liberal society is one characterized by an

acceptance of

different ideas and pursuits, including different conceptions of
the

good

(life).

People

in

a

liberal

society

are

free

to

deliberate, construct, and pursue their own idea of what is good
(or of what constitutes the good life), constrained only by the
minimal principles necessary to maintain social order.

In other

words, a liberal society favors using coercion only when necessary
to make social life possible; S9 in order to maintain itself, such
a society adopts and enforces basic principles that determine what
is right or just, but allows its members to determine and pursue
their own conGeption of what is good as long as this conception
does not violate the basic principles of right.

Within a liberal

society, then, people have different conceptions of the "good life"
and can expect these differing conceptions to be respected even
though they may not be agreed with by others.

Even as a pyrophobe

I should respect my friend's decision to be a fire fighter,
even though she finds

reading Rawls and Kant boring,

and

she must

respect my pursuits in philosophical inquiry and enlightenment.
Along with a personal conception of the good, each individual

4 Rawl s
assumes a liberal society as being favored by his
principles of justice, which he purported would be easily accepted
by individuals (in the original position). I am working backwards
assuming that most of my audience already (loosely, at least)
favors a liberal society and there for should accept my principles
of non-interference.

12
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has a ranking system by which she labels certain elements of this
good as more important or necessary than others; when decisions
between

two

or more

goods

must

be made,

she

determines

what

elements are worth sacrificing in favor of others and makes her
choice appropriately.
down

a

person's

Different elements of good may move up and

ranking

scale

as

priorities,

life

stages,

opportunities, etc. change.
For
pursuits,

example,

a

good

intellectual

interesting people.

life

to

exercise,

me

may

and

include

social

challenging

contact

with

For me as a 22 year old college graduate, the

elements of this good life may include traveling across Europe
alone, dating and meeting new people,
than perhaps graduate school.

and few commitments other

I may, perhaps, choose at this stage

to sacrifice intimate relationships with friends and lovers, stable
employment, and financial security.

At age 25 after three years of

travel, advanced education, and non-committal relationships I may
decide that a good life for me includes different elements; a full
and satisfying personal life

(family,

friends,

lovers,),

and a

stable career may now be things that I find are worth the "cost" of
shouldering the larger amount of responsibility that was before
unattractive.
The

point

is,

in

a

liberal

society

people

are

free

to

deliberate and choose what constitutes the good life for them, and
decide what they are willing to endure or sacrifice to attain this
good.

When we occupy this position of deliberating and making

choices (called the deliberative standpoint) we regard ourselves as
13
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having the

power to affect things in our lives and to choose

between alternative paths and desires.
the idea that we are autonomous.
Personal

Identity

for

more

on

Implicit in this control is

(See section on Korsgaard and
this.)

If

we

do

not

consider

ourselves as having autonomy, we do not regard ourselves as the
causes of our own actions and therefore cannot make any effective
choices about our conduct at all.
autonomy

is

so

very

From a liberal perspective where

important,

there

presumption against interfering with it.

must

exist

a

strong

Thus, because the society

we accept as the best society is a liberal one--one which has as a
corner stone freedom of choice, ,which in turn requires autonomy to
be

effective

and

meaningful--we

must

also

accept

presumption against interfering with autonomy,

a

strong

and thus against

paternalism.
Mill and Kant: The Value of Autonomy
I will start by looking at the positions of two well known
antipaternalists, John Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant.
Kant

start

from

common

ground

with

the

idea

of

Mill and

respect

for

autonomy, and indeed the basic line of argument is similar; both
think

of

autonomy

as

extremely

valuable

and

argue

against

paternalistic interference on the grounds that it undermines the
freedom

of

rational

beings

to

exercise

their

autonomy.

substance of the two arguments, however, is quite different.

The
Kant

and Mill value autonomy very differently and as such have different
ideas as to what "respect for autonomy" should amount to.
Liberty, according to Mill, is pursuing our own good in our
14
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own way and is the most important element of human well-being.
Mill quotes from Wilhelm von Humboldt's The Sphere and Duties of
Government:

" ... the end of man, or that which is prescribed by the

eternal of immutable dictates of reason, .. is the highest and most
harmonious development of his powers ... " (55).

Human powers include "perception,
feeling,

mental activity,

jUdgment,

discriminative

and even moral preference ... ";

mental faculties are "exercised only in making a choice"

these
and are

improved and developed only by being used (Mill 56). In using, and
thus

developing,

these

faculties,

I

make

and

act

on

choices

according to my own desires and inclinations and not those of
others, ie. I act autonomously.
Autonomy; is

valuable

to

Mill,

then,

ingredient of the "ultimate" human end.

because

it

is

an

Mill's idea of respect for

autonomy is treating it as an important element that brings about
good states of affairs for individuals and society at large:
should be protected,

it

encouraged to develop, and maximized. Mill

supports active measures

to

protect and

increase

individuals'

freedom and it is by taking such measures when necessary (and not
interfering when

it

is not)

that we

show respect

for

other's

autonomy.
Kant

values

autonomy

much

differently;

autonomy

is

unconditionally valuable, and valuable as an end itself, as a first
cause and source of value;

as such, autonomy can never be used

merely as a means to some other end.
15

(Thus, any autonomous being

•

is a "first cause" and should be treated as such.
this

in

more

detail

in

the

section

I will discuss

"Kant's

Antipaternalist

position" . )
In order to understand where Kant gets this notion of autonomy
as unconditionally valuable, we must wade through several levels of
his theory before we reach autonomy at the center.

According to

Kant, a good will is the only thing that has intrinsic value--is
"good in itself"--and all rational beings have wills (GMM395).

Our

wills

and

are

the

causal

forces

behind

our

rational

choices,

because we have wills, we have the capacity for rational choice.
This capacity is what Kant calls humanity.

Humanity itself is

independently and unconditionally valuable, that is, valuable under
any

and

all

circumstances,

everything el se.

and

is

the

source

of

value

for

5 Through our humanity we are value-producing

beings; by rationally choosing things, we make them valuable and
nothing

else

has

any

value

independently

of

being

chosen' by

rational beings.
As humanity is the source of all value, it must at all times
5Kant's claim that humanity is unconditionally valuable is not
principally different from his claim about the unconditional value
of a good will because humanity fully realized is the good will.
Because the good will, which is unconditionally valuable, is
humanity fully realized, humanity fully realized is unconditionally
valuable.
In fact, this vein of "unconditional value" can be
traced all the way to rational nature itself; humanity, being the
capacity for making a rational choice, is fully realized only when
the choice itself is fully rational.
The capacity to make fully
rational choices is the capacity to have a good will.
Merely
having the capacity to make rational choices, "whether or not that
capacity is realized, is enough to establish a claim on being
treated as an unconditional end" because with this capacity for
rational choice comes the capacity to have a good will, and a good
will is unconditionally valuable (Korsgaard KFH 197).
16
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be treated as unconditionally valuable; for, as Korsgaard explains,
"If you overturn the source of the goodness, neither your end nor
the action which aims at it can possibly be good ... "
Thus Kant' s

KFH197)

imperative that we

at all

times

humanity in ourselves and other with utmost respect.
another's
choice;

humanity means

this

respecting

means treating

her as

her

capacity

(Korsgaard
treat

Respecting
for

an autonomous

rational

agent,

i . e.

regarding her as someone who makes her own choices and is a "first
cause" of her actions.

Mill's Antipaternalist position
Because John stuart Mill is perhaps one of the most well known
proponents of ;utilitarianism,
holds

a

strong

it may seem odd at first that he

antipaternalist

position

because

initially

utilitarianism does not seem to afford any strong presumptions
against such interference.
charge

that

utilitarianism

it

undermines

does

not

(Most arguments against paternalism
freedom

place

and

fundamental

autonomy,
value

on

and

since

autonomy,

paternalism seems to be of no independent concern to classical
utilitarian theories.)

Onora O'Neill elaborates on this in her

article Paternalism and partial autonomy:
utilitarian moral reasoning takes the production of
welfare or well-being (variously construed) as the
criterion of right action.
Only when respect for
patients' autonomy (fortuitously) maximizes welfare is it
morally required. Paternalism is not morally wrong; but
some acts which attempt to maximize welfare by
disregarding autonomy will be wrong if in fact non
paternalistic action (such as showing respect for others
17
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or seeking their consent to action undertaken) would have
maximized welfare.
Mill, however, holds that the general good of individuals
and society at

large is generally maximized when the personal

liberty/autonomy of rational individuals in the full "maturity of
(their) faculties" is respected:
The reason for not interfering, unless for the sake of
others, with a person's voluntary acts is consideration
for his liberty. His voluntary choice is evidence that
what he so chooses is desirable, or at least endurable,
to him and his good is on the whole best provided for by
allowing him to take his own means of pursuing it (Mill
101) .
Mill's

argument

against

paternalism

according

to

Gerald

Dworkin is as follows:
1. Since restraint is an evil, the burden of
proo£ is on those who propose restraint.
2. Since the conduct that is being considered
is purely self-regarding, the normal appeal to
the protection of the interests of others is
not available.
3.
Therefore, we have to consider whether
reasons
involving
reference
to
the
individual's own good, happiness, welfare, or
interests are sufficient to overcome the
burden of justification.
4. Either we cannot advance the interests of
the individual by compulsion, or the attempt
to do so involves evil that out-weighs the
good done.
5. Hence, the promotion of the individual's
own interests does not provide a sufficient
warrant for the use of compulsion (23).
The distinction used in premise two is one Mill draws between
self-regarding

and

other-regarding
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actions.

Under

this

•

distinction, an action qualifies as self-regarding if it does not
harm

a

particular person or violate

others.

a

particular duty

toward

Since the harm principle does not apply in self-regarding

actions, the only other justification available
in another's purely

self-regarding actions

are

for interference
appeals

to the

person's own good, welfare, interests, etc. and this is patently
paternalistic.

The key to Mill's antipaternalist argument is his claim that
individuals are generally the best judges as to what is in their
best

interest

and

therefore

it

generally

produces

more

good

consequences to let them remain free to make their own decisions in
self-regarding matters, than to let others, who are not as good
judges of their best interest, interfere.
premises for this claim:

There are two supporting

First, Mill holds that individuals are

simply in the best position to decide what is good for them when it
comes to purely self-regarding matters because they know more about
themselves than anyone else; (This is simply an epistemic fact for
Mill);

secondly,

Mill assumes individuals are the parties most

concerned with their own well-being, so they will generally make
the best decisions in self-regarding matters.
that

"we

cannot

advance

the

interests

of

Therefore, it seems
the

individual"

by

interfering with her actions through paternalistic coercion.
Related to his claim that individuals are generally the
best

jUdges of their own

interest,

is Mill's

claim that when

society or other individuals interfere in self-regarding matters,
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even with benevolent motives,

"odds are (they)

interfere wrongly

and in the wrong place" (81):
The traditions and customs of other people, are to a
certain extent, evidence of what their experience has
taught them ... But it is the privilege and proper
condition of a human being arrived at the maturity of his
faculties, to use and interpret experience in his on way.
It is for him to find out what part of recorded
experience
is
properly
applicable
to
his
own
circumstances and character (55).
When others, let's assume they are benevolent others, make
decisions for me, they are taking it upon themselves to jUdge what
is "best" for me based on their experience.

Their experience,

however, may be very narrow, or irrelevant to my situation; they
may have misinterpreted the implications of their past experiences,
or perhaps their idea of what is in my "interest" is not acceptable
to me.

This is obviously returning to the key idea that no one is

a better judge of what is good for a rational individual than the
individual herself.

6

Thus,

Mill holds that society is better

served on the whole (the net consequences are better) when people
exercise their freedom as much as possible and this means making
and acting according to their own decisions,

and even their own

mistakes:
All errors which the individual is likely to commit
against advice and warning are far outweighed by the evil
of allowing others to constrain him to what they deem his
good (75)
and thus, "Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to
~ill does, however, encourage debate, discussion, " ... Advice,
instruction, (and) persuasion" and allows that the ideas and
opinions of individuals may be justifiably swayed or changed
through such avenues (93).
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live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each other to
live as seems good to the rest" (On Liberty) .

Because

of

this

strong

presumption

that

interference

generally does not serve the general good as much as allowing
individuals to be free to self-legislate (even though they may make
"mistakes"), there are very few situations, other than those which
fall under the harm principle, in which an individual's liberty may
be interfered with legitimately:
weak

paternalism--interferences

individual's

actions

are

Interferences that constitute
in

situations

p~imarily

particularly troubling to Mill.

in

which

non-voluntary--are

an
not

(In such cases the presumption

against interference is reversed-it is up to the object of the
interference t9 show why she should be allowed to proceed with her
course of action.)

An individual's liberty may be legitimately

interfered with long enough to provide pertinent information or
warnings
because

regarding her intended action that she may not have,
without

voluntary.

such

information,

her

action

is

not

really

Limited interference is also acceptable in order to

determine whether or not an individual is acting voluntarily.
If it
further

is determined that an individual

7

is acting voluntarily,

interference constitutes strong paternalism and

is not

7Keep in mind that it is because Mill holds that individuals
tend to be the best jUdges of what is in their own interest that
interference
in
self-regarding
actions
usually
has
worse
consequences than non-interference.
If individuals are not the
best judges, as they may not be without all relevant information
and warnings, the presumption in favor of non-interference may not
hold.
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justifiable.
For example,

suppose I

know nothing about the problem of

mixing electrical current and water.

I tell my best friend that I

plan to place my tv on the edge of the bathtub while I

take a

bubble bath because I want to watch the Five o'clock News.

My best

friend would be justified in restricting my actions long enough to
let me know that by situating an electrical tv in a precarious
position on a tub full of water I run a great risk of electrocuting
myself.

By doing so my friend in not really interfering with my

liberty because as Mill says, "liberty consists in doing what one
desires" (95) and I expressed my desire as wanting to watch tv in
the bathtub, not electrocute myself.

Since my actions have a good

chance of leading me toward an end I could not have chosen because
I did not know; anything about (ie. electrocution), my actions are
not primarily voluntary and allowing me to continue would have
grave, irreversible consequences.

After she informs me of the risk

of electrocution, however, she is not justified in restricting my
actions any further if I choose to leave my tv on the tub; this
would be strong paternalism because my actions would be now be
primarily voluntary and according to Mill only I have the right to
jUdge the risks associated with my desires and to decide whether
they are too great bear.
Mill,

however,

also

accepts,

perhaps

even

requires,

interference which constitutes strong paternalism in one case.

For

example, Mill adamantly supports restrictions which prohibit people
from

selling themselves

into

slavery--even though
22

they may

be

acting

voluntarily

paternalism

may

in

doing

seem

so.

This

contradictory

to

endorsement
the

of

extreme

strong
anti

paternalistic position Mill has created for himself; after all, why
shouldn't

I

be

free

to

choose

to

sell

myself

as

a

slave,

especially to an entirely benevolent, intelligent master who will
always make the best decisions for me?

Mill's answer is this: when

a person sells herself into slavery, she is abdicating her liberty
-defeating the "very purpose which is the justification of allowing
(her) to dispose of (herself)" (101).
Prohibiting a person from selling herself into slavery is
justifiable according to Mill because in doing so we are we are
protecting and respecting her "future liberty"

to make decisions

and choices later and we are securing a greater amount (or wider
range) of freedom in general.

The same type of argument supports

prohibitions on suicide; selling myself into slavery or killing
myself are directly destructive to my capacity to make my· own
choices and decisions.

Mill holds that prohibitions on suicide,

slavery, and other such "destructive" behavior, even though they
are interfering with my freedom to voluntarily choose to act in a
certain way

in primarily self-regarding matters,

protect more

freedom than they limit, and are thereby justified.

Kant's Antipaternalist Position
The key idea to understanding Kant's position on paternalism
is recognizing each person as having the capacity for autonomy, and
therefore having the right to self-legislation.
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According to
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Kant, because every person has a will, which is an autonomous power
of causality, each person is herself a "free" or "first" cause and
must always be treated as such.

(In other words, to say one has a

will, is to say that she has the capacity for rational choice, and
should thus always be treated as though she is using this capacity
and using it well.)

To call someone a first cause is to say she

has the power or ability within herself to decide to begin, and in
fact to actually instigate, a particular chain of causal actions
and reactions.

Because she has the capacity to make

(rational)

choices, she can be the "starter" of chains of actions toward ends
she has decided upon, or choose to be a part of another chain of
action leading to another's end.
Always regarding another as a first cause means adopting a
"hands off" type of respect:

no "active" measures are to be taken

to "protect" or "maximize" another's autonomy; for by the very act
of "protecting" it, you are overriding it, because by interfering
at

all,

you

place

yourself

in

a

causal

position

above

the

individual and thus they are no longer a first cause, but a mediate
one.

We

practicing

also

have

perfect duties

to

others

to

refrain

from

coercion and deception because such practice makes it

impossible for me to consent to contribute to an end or action.

In

taking away my opportunity to consent through coercing or deceiving
me, others are robbing me of my status as a first cause:
The idea of deciding for yourself whether you will
contribute to a given end can be represented as a
decision whether to initiate that causal chain which
consti tutes your contribution. Any action which prevents
or diverts you from making this initiating decision is
one that treats you as a mediate rather than a final
24
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(first) cause (Korsgaard RTL334) .
When we engage in coercive or deceptive practices we treat
someone else's person or reason (respectively) as a mediate cause;
since they cannot assent to or dissent from contributing to our end
they cannot share in it or make their end,
causal power whatsoever.

and really have no

We are treating them as a mediate cause,

as a mere means or tool to be used by us toward our end.

A tool

has two characteristics; it is to be used, and does not control
itself (Korsgaard RTL335).

If we return to the idea of paternalism

as "benevolent coercion, " it becomes clear that what is true of
coercion

is

motives.

Kant does not stop here, however; he makes it clear that

we

are

true

not

irrational

even
to

of

paternalism,

to

interfere

"save"

or

regardless

with

"protect"

someone

them

from

of

who

my

we

their

benevolent

think
own

is

faulty

reasoning. Korsgaard explains:

We are not only forbidden to use another as a mere means
to our private purposes ... We are also forbidden to take
attitudes toward her which involve regarding her as not
in control of herself, which is to say, not using her
reason" (Korsgaard RTL 335) .
What

this

tells

us

is

that

even when

an

individual

makes

inappropriate, "bad", or even dangerous choices we cannot interfere
and deprive her of the right to self-legislation even though it
seems she is doing a poor job of "legislating" to herself.

(It is

like the right to vote in united states elections; all citizens
have

it regardless of whether or not they are good
25

judges of

•

presidents.

Making poor judgments does not disqualify us from
We cannot treat some as less of an autonomous

being judges.)

agent because she is exercising her autonomy "badlyll or in ways we
do not agree with:
We cannot decide someone is insufficiently
autonomous merely because he makes some
choices we would not have made in his place.
But further: we cannot decide someone is not
autonomous because he is regularly making
decisions we know are bad in the sense of
immoral. It is the capacity for autonomy, not
its actual exercise, which gives a person the
right to self-government (Korsgaard TAAL 40).
Thus,

Kant's

antipaternalist

position

in

review:

paternalistic interference intq the affairs of autonomous persons
is immoral because it treats them as mediate cause or mere means
which

is

a

direct

violation

of

their

autonomy.

We

can

not

manipulate a person's status as an autonomous agent and consider
her

less of

one

(who could therefore be

paternalized)

simply

because we view the decisions she makes as a self-legislator to be
incorrect or IIbad ll

•

Mill and Kant:

A Last Comparison

Both Mill and Kant hold that strong paternalism is wrong
because it infringes upon an individual's "right to decide ll .

They

disagree, however, as to why individuals have this right at all,
and this difference brings up two different problems
positions.

in their

For Mill, it is simply a fact that in general people

are the best judges of what is in their own best interest,
therefore they should be the ones to make decisions
regarding matters.

and

in self-

The problem here is that if a person is not the
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best jUdge of what is in her best interest, she may justifiably be
the object of paternalism.

How do we decide whether or not a

particular person is the "best jUdge"?

We must determine whether

she is rational and if her decisions are good ones.

Not only does

judging other's decisions calls for tricky value judgments (that
especially as members of a liberal society) we should hesitate to
make,

but the

idea of rationality is not black and white;

if

rationality is a matter of degree, how rational must a person be to
be

considered

the

"best

consti tutes irrationality?

judge"

of

her

own

interest?

What

Answering these questions brings up

many problems concerning arbitrariness and consistency that Kant's
position avoids.
individual
because

it

For Kant, it does not matter whether or not an

is the best jUdge of what is in her best interests
is; simply the capacity

for autonomy that

gives

an

individual the "right to decide", and all beings with a will have
this capacity, (there is not the problem of determining whether or
not the person is a "good judge"), thus paternalistic interference
is prohibited, period.
Kant's position is much stronger than Mill's;
problem is that it is too strong.
looks like strong paternalism is

in fact,

the

There are some cases in which it
(or should be)

Kant's position would hold the opposite.

justified that

I do, however, believe

that Kant's notion of respecting persons is generally preferable
and more appropriate than Mill's, and with the exception of certain
types of situations, serves as a better guide by which to jUdge
whether or not paternalism is justified.
27

•

Accepting a Kantian View of Persons as Autonomous, ValueConferring Beings.
The

Kantian

idea

of

respecting

persons

as

first

causes

(autonomous agents) encompasses something of great importance that
utilitarianism neglects nearly completely:

notions of personal

identity and of our relation to our own projects

(i. our goals,

actions, accomplishments, etc.) that cohere to our deep intuitions
about our personal identity.
Korsgaard's

account

B

of

personal

identity

emphasizes

the

importance of agency and authorship; we are who we are because we
exercise our agency in certain.ways according to various choices
between desires.

(To the extent I exercise authorship and agency,

I am the person ME--I have a certain will.)

Generally speaking, I

identify myself a person who has the power to be active leader of
my life, and more specifically, I identify myself as the person I
am--ME--as such because I have certain traits that are defined by
my having certain desires and a particular way in which I choose
between these desires in order to do particular things.

I identify

my SELF as a "thing" in a position "over and above" my desires; a
position by nature of which my self has access to all of them, can
del iberate,

make

choice,

and

act

on

the

chosen

desire.

relationship to my actions is essentially "authorial";
them,

I

am responsible for them,

and they are mine.

I

My
cause

Korsgaard

BIn the section that follows are ideas from or inspired by the
Kantian theory of personal identity laid out in Korsgaard's article
"Personal Identity and the unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to
Parfit."
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elaborates:
I believe that when we think about the way in which our
own lives matter to us personally, we think of ourselves
in this way.
We think of living our lives, and even
having our experiences as something that we do (PI331).
This

"special"

relationship

to

our

actions

is

what

under the utilitarian view we

utilitarianism disregards:

are

merely bundles of experiences or persons who have things happen to
them.

utilitarian

agents

are

not

only

responsible

consequences of their action, but also of their inaction.
this example:

for

the

Consider

I am placed by a band of six stressed-out biology

majors in a room that is empty, save a chair and a white control
panel with a red button. It is explained to me that I have five
minutes to press the button which will release poisonous, deadly
gas into the locked office of a biology professor who is grading
finals.

(Death will immediately result for the professor.)

The

band of bio-rebels also informs me that if I have not pressed the
button within five minutes, they will blow up the entire building,
killing many more people and destroying expensive property.
seven

of

us,

however,

will

not

be

injured.)

(The

According

to

utilitarianism, if I do not press the button, I will be responsible
for the bio-rebels blowing up Sherff, because through my inaction,
I "caused" the consequences.

In other words, what they do figures

into my status as a moral being,
pressing the button, does not.
having

a

certain

and my own behavior,

of not

This destroys my idea of myself as

relationship

to

my

actions

which

is

very

important; if I do not consider myself as the author of my actions,
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my life loses an important kind of value for me.

My successes and

failures matter to me particularly because they are mine; I believe
that I

actively instigated them and that I

making the decisions leading to them.

an responsible for

My actions and experiences

have a special meaning to me; I get embarrassed or hurt when people
laugh at something I DID because I am responsible for doing it--I
was controlling or choosing the action .
. . . we are agents ... we are free ... and we are
responsible ... view ourselves in these ways
when we occupy the standpoint of practical
reason--that is, when we are deciding what to
do.
This follows from the fact that we must
regard ourselves as the causes--the first
causes--of the things.that we will. (Korsgaard
PI330) .
Where utilitarianism, in the words of Bernard Williams,
"alienates

one

from

one's

moral

feelings ll ,

a

encompasses our intuitions, and supports them.

Kantian

theory

9

Justifing Limited strong Paternalism:
Maintaining a Kantian Perpsective
According to a straightforwardly Kantian position, when I act
paternalistically toward someone I am not allowing them to exercise
their agency and be "authors" of their actions.

I am not granting

them the freedom of will necessary to be "moral creatures"-- I am
not

respecting

rationally

set

their
and

basic

pursue

tie
ends

to

humanity,

their

own

the

ends.

capacity
Having

to

this

capacity to self-legislate (autonomy) is valuable because it is at
the foundation of our concept of moral and personal identity.

When

9 1 am not claiming that I have made this support entirely
evident here, only that I have demonstrated how Kant's theory
encompasses our intuitions about personal identity.
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you act paternalistically toward someone you are not treating them
as an autonomous agent capable of making certain choices; in short,
you are undermining something as basic and necessary as their
identity as the person they are

and as deep as

the

basis of

morality itself.

Because we intuitively, at a very deep level, regard ourselves
as

first

causes

and

identify

ourselves

as

"agents ... free .. and

responsible .. ", I agree that it seems that a moral theory that hold
autonomy as important at a very deep level is the most appropriate
and attractive.

(As rule, result oriented theories such as Mill's

hold autonomy only as "derivative concern",

where action based

moral theories such as Kant's hold it as a "basic concern".)
not,

however,-

believe

that

paternalistic interference.

such

a

view

has

no

room

I do
for

The most important reason we need to

accept a Kantian view of why autonomy is so valuable is that'our
conception of personal identity relies upon it;
actually respecting when treat

someone as

so what we are

autonomous

conception of themselves as the people they are.

is

their

I hold that there

are some situations in which paternalistic interference is not
particularly detrimental to an individual's conception of personal
identity, and therefore is justifiable.

(This position obviously

has Kantian undertaones, but is not as strongly antipaternalistic
as a pure Kantian view.)
situations where there is an empirically high risk that can be
eliminated through paternalistic interference, we are justified in
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doing so.

I

also think that there are people who

should be

respected as having the capacity to make some decisions and not
others.

These situations are to be thought of as exceptions to a

straight Kantian position. and when they are not present. we should
operate
persons.

according to

the general

Kantian

rule

of

respect

for

This position is not as strong as Kant's, but is still

based in the idea a Kantian respect for persons as autonomous
agents.

When is Paternalism Justified?

Partial Autonomy
According to Onora O'Neill,

"Human autonomy is limited and

precarious in many contexts ... " and human beings are "imperfectly
autonomous for; a greater part of their lives"

(174).

In order to

limit inappropriate paternalism and keep a Kantian antipaternalist
argument based in respect for autonomy, I believe that we should
operate from the premise that even at their best, human beings are
not perfectly autonomous or perfectly rational beings.
This means that certain people in certain stages of their
lives and perhaps ceratin situations may be paternalized more than
others.
includes

In fact,
and

each individual has a scope of autonomy that

disincludes

certain

choices

Children, for example, have limited autonomy,

from

being

made.

and should not be

granted the full right of non-interference, but they do have the
capacity to make certain decisions and should be allowed to do so
without paternalistic intervention.
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Other decisions, however, are

•
outside of their scope and rightfully fall to parents and others to
make.

People who are ill also may have limited autonomy, but can

still make certain decisions as

can people who are depressed,

confused or ignorant.

Social Insurance Policies
When I make certain decisions or claims on myself,
ones to quit smoking, to diet, to stop watching tv,
pass

a

law

for

myself

to

follow.

"enforcing" it "against" myself,
made the decision and gave

th~

In

following

such as

I willfully

this

law

I am acting autonomously,
law to myself.

and
as I

(I am not acting

autonomously in following laws I had nothing to do with setting
up.)

Others, however, have no "right" to "enforce" my own laws

against me.

(This would be like the Canadian Royal Mounted Police

holding occupation in the United States against the wishes of our
government to enforce our speed limits on highways; even though our
government set up the law to be followed, and indeed want people to
respect it, the Canadian Royal Mounted Police have no right to give
effect to our government's desires.)
If I do not follow my law, and "enforce" it on myself, ie. I
keep buying cigarettes or eating hot fudge sundaes, the law really
has no substance.

(Laws do not amount to anything without being

followed and enforced.) If my law is important to me, however, I
want it to have substance and be effective, but my will may not be
not strong enough to enforce the law I gave to myself at all times.
In such situations, I can take out "social insurance policy" of
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sorts that protects against my weakness of will.
amounts to

This "insurance"

involving another person or group of people in the

enforcement of my law by asking them to accept my end, say of not
smoking,

as their end also.

(This means they adopt my quitting

smoking as their end--they themselves do not have to quit smoking.)
If I ask them to be involved, and they agree to be, I have given my
consent for the law to be enforced against me by these people; I
have entitled them to use coercion to "force" me to respect my law
to myself when I do not do so on my own.

When others consent to

help me toward my ends, they are sharing or letting me use their
"power" to choose and pursue ends.

This is not disrespectful to

their humanity (I am not treating them as a mere means)

because

they consented and in doing so adopted my end as theirs.
A social ";insurance policy" does not last forever; 1 ike health
insurance or life insurance it needs to be renewed periodically and
may be canceled.

In order for the

"policy"

to be effective,

however, there must limits as when this can be done.

When I am in

the midst of a nicotine fit or experiencing withdraw symptoms I can
not spontaneously announce that I no longer want others to enforce
my law of "No Smoking" against me, and neither at such times may
those who I have enlisted to "help" me enforce the law withdraw
from our agreement.

If at some point, when I am not at the moment

experiencing the weakness of will I was seeking to protect against
with an insurance policy, I wish to cancel the policy, I have the
right to do

so.

against

may

me

(Those who have consented to hold the policy
also

withdraw
34

their

consent

under

these

•

circumstances.)

Decreasing Risk (Procedural Paternalism)
Paternalism is justified in order to minimize the risks involved in
certain behavior when the individual's freedom to do the action is
not generally affected.
While this is strong paternalism,

it is "procedural" only;

what is regulated here is not an individual's freedom to do a risky
action,

only how,

carried out.

or under what conditions the

action may be

Mandatory helmet laws or seat belt laws, or other

"safety" requirements are examples of this kind of paternalism.
This guideline encompasses a strong intuition by allowing us to
"help" or "protect" those we care about to the greatest extent
possible

while

still

therefore does not

respecting

their

autonomous

choice,

seem to have the problems that

"dangerous" or "risky" actions are not allowed.

and

arise when

Also, this type of

paternalism is no real threat to autonomous decision making and
does not enforce a "code of values" that supposedly governs what is
and is not an "acceptable risk" to take. (The paternalism is still
barred

from

interfering simply because

she

does

not

agree

an

individual's choice to act in a particular way.)

A certain extent of paternalism is justified where the action
is empirically risky and not reversible (or the probable outcome of
the action is not reversible)

and the agent's freedom to do the

action is generally affected.
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Paternalism to keep and agent from harming herself where the
action is irreversible is justified in so far as first restricting
the action for a period of time during which the agent's capacity
for evaluation -not the evaluation itself- could be looked at. This
period

would

serve

as

well

as

a

cooling

off

period

for

the

individual considering the action so that she may be certain she
wants

to

choose

this

course

of

action.

If

the

capacity

for

evaluation is found to be impaired, or if the agent is suspected of
being under the influence of "suspect means of interference" (mind
altering drugs, hypnotic suggestion, etc.) that is, the action is
non-voluntary,
recovers.
the

the agent may be paternalized until the capacity

If the capacity is found to be appropriate for making

choice,

interference

the

action

would

would

constitute

be

voluntary,

strong

and

paternalism,

thus

further

but

further

interference consistent with procedural paternalism is justifed.

When the evaluative rationality of an action is in question
and the action is reversible, interference is not justified beyond
intelligent argument.
What is involved is this cases is a value jUdgement and this
immediately should call for a presumption against paternalism. (See
the section on Paternalism in a Liberal Society.)

Even if the

agent's scale of value seems absolutely and inherently confused or
incorrect, the action is reversible so a confused agent can indeed
change her value scale in reflection after the action is done.
Intellectual argumentation is always justified, for it only brings
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new ideas to light or presents old ideas in new light and leaves
the evaluation up to individuals.
In similar cases where the action is irreversible but poses no
specific threat to the
disposition,
specific

agent

(threats to

the

general

health,

attitude or quality of life of an agent are not

threats)

paternalism

argumentation.
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is

not

justified

beyond

•

specific Cases of Paternalism
1.

In the midst of severe depression T.
cult.

joins a brainwashing

Every week she has a brainwashing appointment with a doctor

in the cult whom she thinks is a psychologist.
to blindly
doesn't

follow

feel

the cult

depressed.

brainwashed.)

leader,
(She

He brainwashes her

and while

does

not

know

between

times

that

she

enjoys

depressed all the time any more.
to

explain

she

is

she

being

Sometimes between sessions the brainwashing wears

off, and T, returns to her severe depression.
in

brainwashed

to

her

that

she

cult

She claims in these

life

and

doesn't

feel

I kidnap T. from the cult and try
is

being

brainwashed.

When

the

brainwashing has worn off she believes me, thanks me, and stays
away from the cult and begins to see a real psychologist to help
her depression.
This is a case of weak paternalism.

Mill would say I was

justified because while T. may have made a rational choice to be in
the cult (It helped her depression, she made new friends, etc.),
she did not make a voluntary choice to be brainwashed.

Kant would

say that my interference was not justified because I must respect
T. 's capacity to
exercising it.

reason,

regardless of whether or not

she

is

My position is that because T. was the victum of

"suspect means" of interference, ie. brainwashing, I was justifed
in intervening on her behalf.
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What if given the information that she is being brainwashed,
T. still wishes to return to the cult, claiming she is choosing to
be brainwashed? This now strong paternalism because T.
voluntarily.

is acting

Mill would say I could justifiably prevent her from

doing so for reasons analogous to those why humans are constrained
from selling themselves into slavery, ie. she is disposing of the
very thing,

her autonomy,

choice to dispose of it.

that would require us to respect her
(Someone can not rationally choose to

dispose of her rationality.)

Kant, on the other hand,

I believe

would say that while T.'s actions are not right, I am not justified
in interfering.

I believe Kant would say that by choosing to be

brainwashed T. is giving up her capacity for rational choice, and
in doing so is disposing of herself as a "source of value" (see top
of page 17), but since Kant's idea of respect for autonomy requires
that

I

refrain

from

coercion,

and

"protecting"

T.' s

autonomy

constitutes coercion, I am not justified in interfering even though
T. is acting wrongly.
Now, if T. does not believe me when I tell her she is being
brainwashed, maybe my evidence is not sufficient for her standards,
and

she

wishes

interfering?
autonomy

by

believe me.)

to

return

to

the

cult,

am

I

justified

in

(In this case T. is not "choosing" to dispose of her
being

brainwashed,

she

is

This is strong paternalism.

simply

choosing

not

to

Mill would say that I am

justifed in interfering if T.'s decison is

irrational~

if she is

simply refusing to accept my claim that she is being brainswashed
in the face of good evidence, she is not making a rational choice,
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•
and according to Mill, she is no longer the "best judge" of her own
interest,

and

therefore

paternal ism

is

j usti fed.

For

Kant,

however, being the "best judge" makes no difference; I must respect
T.'s choice even if she is a bad judge of her own interest.
this case I agree with Kant.

In

I must assume that T. has reasons to

disbelieve me--I must assume that she is using her rationality and
using it well in this case.

If I were to interfere and not allow

her to return to the cult I would be showing immense disrespect for
her right to decide whether or not to believe me.
2.

c. smokes heavily and tells me she wishes to quit for her
health, but claims she enjoys smoking a lot and that she is too
addicted to do quit.

(Withdrawal symptoms, etc.)

I secretly slip

magic pills into her lunch food that make her no longer crave
cigarettes:

she does not feel any withdrawal symptoms,

and the

pills have no side effects. C. quits smoking.
This

is

justified.

strong

C.

paternalism.

Mill

would

an

I

was

not

is acting voluntarily, and as long as she smokes

where it only effects her, I can not interfere.
becomes

say

"other-regarding"

action,

interfere under the harm principle.)

then

I

(If her smoking
can

justifiably

Kant and I agree again: I was

absolutely not justified in interfering in C.'s action, because I
must respect her choice to smoke even though it is bad for health.
(Kant does hold that we have duties to protect our health, but this
duty

is

not

categorical

and

rises

out

of

prudence

Similarly, I hold that while smoking poses a risk,
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only.)

it is only a

•

general risk to her health.

She knows the risks of smoking, and

understands that it is a weakness of will that keeps her from
quitting, but has not included me in her end of quitting smoking,
so I can not give her will the extra "power" it needs to quit.

2a.
Now, C. has decided to quit smoking and has stated that in
order

to

achieve

this

possession cigarettes.

goal,

she

will

no

longer

have

in

her

"In order to quit smoking I will no longer

carry cigarettes on my person or have them in my car or house, etc.
I will not buy, bum, or steal cigarettes", she states.

Later that

day I see C. in Walgreens buyin9 a pack of cigarettes.

I run up to

her, grab them away and refuse to allow her buy them.

"I want to

buy those", she yells.
"Yes!!" she says.
her

around

making

"Do you still want to stop smoking?" I ask.

I do not let her buy them, and in fact follow
sure

she

does

not

buy,

beg

or

steal

any

cigarettes.
This is strong paternalism.

Again, Kant and Mill would both

say I was not justified in interfering.

I agree; even though C.

made her intention public and in so many words admitted to having
a weak will where smoking is concerned, she still did not assent to
anyone's "help" (so it is not a "social insurance policy" case) and
she is still acting voluntarily (so it is strong paternalism.)
2b.

C. has asked me to not allow her to possess cigarettes, "No
matter how much" she protests,

because she has decided to quit

smoking and in order to do so she must not have cigarettes around.
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I do not let her buy cigarettes even though later in the day she
insists

she has changed her mind and no

longer wants

to quit

smoking.
This was strong paternalism because C's actions in insisting
she wanted to smoke were primarily voluntary.

I hold that I was

justified in interfering, however, because C. and I "joined forces"
so to speak; by asking for my help she is giving me the chance to
decide whether or not to help her,

(so she is not using me as a

mere means), and also by asking for my help, she included me in her
end and gave consent to have her law of "no smoking" enforced by
me.
3.

My friend J. feels that the effort involved in making complex,
informed decisions is just too much for her to handle.

(She does

fine with trivial ones like what to wear, what to eat, etc.) When
she has lot of information she feels paralyzed in analysis' and
feels powerless to choose.

She is so adamant about not wanting to

be forced to "weigh the serious alternatives" between choices that
she declares that no one is to provide her with any information
about alternatives and that she plans to avoid as much information
as possible, saying "Don't tell me
know.

It

is

not

in my best

I don't want to

X,

interest

to

know because

detrimental to my well being to make complex decisions."
her

it

is

I tell

X

This is a case of benefit paternalism.
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I was not justified in

•

telling J., It is not up to me to decide what is her best interest;
because she has the capacity to decide what is in her own good and
to pursue whatever that may be, I must treat her as if she using
that capacity even though I do not agree with what she decides.
If however, X. was information concerning risks involved with
J.'s conduct, I would be justified in giving her the information.
This would be a case of strong paternalism because J.'s decision
not to be given the information was voluntary, but I am justified
in interfering because J.'s choice to continue the conduct would
not be voluntary without the information concerning the risk.

4.

K is mildly but permanently ill.
flashes

of

debilitating.)

pain-something

(Chronic fatigue, or mild

uncomfortable

but

not

totally

The doctor says K. will live a long life, but there

are many things she will not be able to enjoy because of her
illness.

(Her quality of life will be affected.)

The doctor has

also said that there is a possibility the illness will clear up on
its own over time, but that a few doses of a light medication with
no side effects will clear it up immediately and permanently.

K.

is opposed to taking medication and refuses treatment, saying she
would rather "wait it out".
food.

I

secretly slip the doses in her

K. feels better, but assumes it is because the illness has

cleared up on its own.
This is a case of strong-benefit paternalism in which I was
not justified in interfering.

K. was informed of the risks of not
43
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taking the medication and of the positive effects it would have on
her.

I may think her choice is irrational, but that does not give

me the right to interfere; it is her decision based on what she
takes to be good reasons.

I must trust that she is using her

rational capacity and doing so well.

4a.
Same case, except K.'s illness is rapidly fatal, though not
painful.

(One dose of medicine will still cure it.)

This is now a case of strong-harm paternalism.
of

not

taking

the

medicine

is

primarily

K.'s actions

voluntary

and

by

interfering I am preventing her from harming herself by not taking
it.

I am justified in interfering here as in cases of procedural

paternalism; interference would not be justified to "force" K. to
change her stance on taking medication in general, but the risks
she incurs when she acts on her position can be minimized.
case should be especially clear,

(This

because there is no jUdgement

being made about the quality of life; it is either life or death
period.)

5.

JB loves bubble baths, and also loves to watch the news and
her favorite sitcoms.

In order to do both at the same time, JB

places the tv on the side of the bath tub, running a great risk of
electrocution.

Thanks to her friend in the example in the section

"Mill's Antipaternalist Position" she is aware of the risk,
44

but
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still

chooses to continue watching

sitting on the side of the tub.

from the tUb,

with the tv

Her friend tells her roommate to

make sure that when JB takes a bath the tv is sitting on the
counter across the room from the tUb, and not on the tub itself.
The next time JB takes a bubble bath, her roommate barges into the
bathroom and moves the tv to the counter.
This is strong paternalism, but it is justified because the
victim is not prevented entirely from doing the action, she can
still bathe and watch tv, but the risk is greatly reduced.

45
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Summary Remarks

The antipaternalist positions of both Mill and Kant turn of
the notion of repsect for autonomy.

As I have discussed, Kant and

Mill have different reasons for valuing autonomy,

and therefore

their ideas as to what constitutes "respect" are different.
argued that we

should accept a

Kantian notion of respect

I
for

autonomy over a Mill's because a Kantian view incorporates and
preserves our deepest intuitions on personal identity.

However, I

think a straight Kantian view is to strongly antipaternalistic and
I

have

therefore

assumed

a

"quasi-Kantian"

position.

I

have

attemped to maintain a notion of respect for autonomy with Kantian
undertones to preserve our concpetion of personal identity, while
at the same time allowing limited strong paternalism.

•
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